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<ABSTRACT>
 
This paper offers an update - from the European 
perspective - to the debate on property rights in 
personal data. It argues that recent developments 
in the data processing technology and practices, 
specifically, the AI-driven Big Data Analytics, have 
rendered personal data a difficult object of en-
forceable individual property rights. There are two 
main reasons for this. First, data processing re-
sulting from a decision of one person will in-
evitably have spill-over effects on others, e.g. as 
a result of profiling, or as a result of the same 
piece of data relating to a group of people, e.g. 
genetic data. This phenomenon is also called 
‘network effects’. Therefore, true individual control 
over personal data and also the effective enforce-
ment of the individual property rights in personal 
data are difficult if not impossible to achieve. 
Second, creating and managing property rights 
that are transparent in terms of the object of 
property and the rights-holders is also challenging. 
This is due to the dynamic approach to the defi-
nition of personal data adopted in Europe: the 
same piece of data, depending on a particular 
context, can be personal and non-personal, more 
or less likely to relate to an identifiable natural 
person, and with a stronger or weaker link to that 
person. While this does not necessarily constitute 
a problem for the purposes of the data protection 
law, and the broadest definition of personal data 
can achieve the goals of complete and effective 
protection, enforcing property rights in personal 
data is difficult. The difficulty lies, first, in de-
termining at which point the level of relation to an 
individual is sufficient to establish property rights, 
and second, in tracing the presence of such a 
relation.
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Ⅰ. Introduction
In 2016 Klaus Schwab, the founder of the 
World Economic Forum, coined the term ‘Fourth 
Industrial Revolution’ to refer to the ongoing 
technology-led transformation of how we live and 
work that has been unfolding across nations and 
industries. According to Schwab, the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution builds on the advances in in-
formation technology and the resulting digitiza-
tion, or ‘the Third Industrial Revolution’. Yet, it 
fundamentally differs in ‘velocity, scope and sys-
tems impact’, leading to the ‘fusion of tech-
nologies that is blurring the lines between the 
physical, digital, and biological spheres’.1) 
Unprecedented connectivity of people and devices 
embodied in the Internet of Things (‘IoT’) and 
smart environments, advances in Artificial 
Intelligence (‘AI’) merging with robotics are just 
some of the forerunners of the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution. 
Data is the lifeblood of this transformation. To 
name just a few examples, data is generated by 
and transferred through the connectivity infra-
structures; the AI algorithms ‘feed’ on it and learn 
to better recognize relevant patterns. Data has be-
come an essential part of (knowledge) production, 
management and governance; think of the da-
1) K Schwab ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, 
how to respond’ (2016) www.weforum.org, published 16 
January 2016.
ta-driven production of digital content and serv-
ices, data-driven (precision) medicine, data-driven 
process control, e.g. in agriculture, prediction and 
decision-making in private and public sectors. 
Underlying it all, data has been acknowledged as 
an essential resource for economic growth. It is 
estimated that in Europe alone by 2020 the size of 
the data economy may increase to €739 billion, 
or 4% of the overall EU GDP.2) Therefore, the 
question of data ownership and the related ques-
tions of data access are key to maintaining a de-
gree of control over this technological, economic 
and societal transformation that the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution is said to be. 
As the Call for Contributions invited to exam-
ine possible regulatory paradigms that can ‘lead 
the ongoing Fourth Industrial Revolution’, this pa-
per will focus on the property rights in data as 
one such regulatory paradigm. More specifically, 
this paper will address property rights in personal 
data, since a significant and still growing share of 
data relates to identified or identifiable natural 
persons, and hence constitutes ‘personal data’ in 
the sense of the EU data protection law.
The question this paper will answer at least in 
part is if individual property rights in personal da-
ta still make sense in Europe. The analysis will 
rely on the European policy and legislative frame-
work, inter alia, regarding the meaning of prop-
erty rights and the goals and content of the data 
protection law. Yet, the arguments in this paper 
could also be used outside Europe in the same 
contexts where the European propertisation debate 
takes place3) and to the extent that the general-
2) European Commission ‘Building a European Data Economy’, 
published 10 January 2017, available online at <https://ec.eur
opa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/building-european-
data-economy>, last accessed 27 September 2017.
3) See 2 for description of the contexts.
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izations about the meaning of property are correct.
While the matter of property in personal data 
has received considerable attention in the literature 
since 1970s, the discussion is in need of a serious 
update. Indeed, while little new analyses were 
added to the property in personal data literature in 
the past years,4) data processing technologies and 
practices as well as the European policy and legis-
lative landscape have made giant leaps that need 
to be taken into account.
Specifically, the adoption in April 2016 of the 
General Data Protection Regulation5) (‘GDPR’) 
marked the end of the European data protection 
reform and is a major development on a legis-
lative level. According to the European 
Commission, one of the general objectives of the 
reform was “[t]o increase the effectiveness of the 
fundamental right to data protection”, which im-
plied, among others, “that individuals are in con-
trol of their personal data and trust the digital 
environment.”6) As a result, the GDPR contains 
4) Most analyses that are published in the part 5 years are rely-
ing on the propertisation arguments developed before 2012 
and hence pre-Big Data (e.g. S Spiekermann, A Acquisti, R 
Böhme and KL Hui ‘The challenges of personal data markets 
and privacy’ (2015) 25(2) Electronic Markets, 161–167).
5) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), published in 
Official Journal of the European Union, Vol 59, 4 May 2016.
6) Table 1 in European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the document Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of in-
dividuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation) and Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the 
purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prose-
cution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal pen-
alties, and the free movement of such data’ Commission 
Staff Working Paper SEC (2012) 72 final, Brussels, 
25.1.2012, 43.
new rights considered by some to be prop-
erty-like, e.g. the rights to data portability and to 
erasure (‘the right to be forgotten’).7)
The continued datafication and advances in the 
AI-enabled Big Data Analytics are another major 
change that needs to be considered in the property 
debate. Namely, datafication stands for the mod-
ern data mining and advanced data analytics tech-
niques that are able to turn literally everything in-
to data, including what we never thought of as 
containing or being data at all.8) In addition, the 
AI-enabled Big Data Analytics is able to lay con-
nections between people and data quicker and dif-
ferently from how it was done before. These phe-
nomena together result in the general increase in 
the quantity of data available and more data being 
‘personal’. This fundamentally alters the scale of 
the debate on property rights in personal data, the 
change being both quantitative and qualitative.
Before the analysis can begin, I will briefly 
deal with the matter of nomenclature. In the con-
text of this analysis a property right in law is un-
derstood as any legally protected interest in an 
object, tangible or intangible, that is directed 
against the entire world and hence has a so-called 
erga omnes effect.9) This meaning of property 
rights is not attached to any one jurisdiction, but 
derives from studies in comparative European 
property law. Property rights understood as the 
rights to exclude, alienability, or the ability to 
sell, is therefore not a necessary defining charac-
teristic of property.10) To be recognised as inter-
7) This point is further developed in 2.1.
8) V Mayer-Schönberger and K Cukier, Big data: A revolution 
that will transform how we live, work, and think (Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt 2013) 29.
9) N Purtova, Property Rights in Personal Data: a European 
Perspective (Kluwer Law International 2011) 57 et seq.
10) ibid. 86-88. But see E Ostrom and C Hess, ‘Private and 
Common Property Rights’ (2010) in B Bouckaert (ed.) 
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ests of a proprietary nature, and to consequently 
enjoy proprietary status, rights must comply with 
two ‘leading principles of property law’ or 
‘filters’, as Van Erp describes them:11) the nu-
merus clausus principle, i.e. the rights have to be 
on the list of property rights recognised as such 
by law, and their content cannot be modified at 
all, or can only be modified a little; and the prin-
ciple of transparency, i.e. the rights have to be 
made public, either by registration (in the case of 
immovable property) or possession (in the case of 
movable objects).12)
The argument will progress in the following 
steps. Part 2 will provide some background of the 
propertization debate by introducing three contexts 
in which the property in personal data talk is rele-
vant and arguably makes sense: (1) privacy-pro-
tective potential of property rights, (2) economic 
interest and investment in data, and (3) data 
access. Importantly, this paper will not advocate 
in favor of introducing property rights in personal 
data for any of the three reasons, but rather list 
and elaborate on these reasons as plausible ration-
ales of propertization that deserve consideration. 
Part 3 is where the core of the argument will lie. 
It will explore the feasibility of introducing and 
managing property rights in personal data from 
the perspective of individual control in personal 
data and transparency of property rights if 
introduced. Part 4 will conclude the paper with a 
discussion. 
Property Law and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2010) 338: ‘Property-rights systems that do not contain the 
right of alienation are considered to be ill-defined.’.
11) S Van Erp, ‘From “Classical” To Modern European Property 
Law?’ Essays in honour of Konstantinos D. Kerameus 
(Bruylant 2009) Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1372166, 10.
12) Ibid.
Ⅱ. Context: Three Reasons to Talk 
about Property in Personal Data
1. Privacy-protective potential of 
property rights. Individual control 
over their data
Proposals to introduce property rights in per-
sonal data have emerged in the United States as 
early as the 1970s,13) and have been subject of 
academic discussion ever since. Property right un-
derstood as the right to exclude, a significant part 
of the debate considered propertization as a means 
of giving back to the individual control over data 
pertaining to him or her.14) Some arguments have 
been made against propertization, a predominant 
anti-propertization argument being that informa-
tional privacy is a public good and propertization 
facilitating market exchange would not be able to 
secure it.15) In response, other scholars have of-
fered property models consistent with and argu-
ably enhancing informational privacy.16)
In Europe the idea to introduce property rights 
in personal data to achieve data protection goals 
gained traction since property was considered by 
some particularly suitable to secure the core of the 
European data protection, i.e. individual control over 
13) A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum 1967).
14) e.g. E J Janger, ‘Muddy Property: Generating and 
Protecting Information Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy’ (2003) 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801; J Rule, Privacy in Peril: 
How We Are Sacrificing a Fundamental Right in Exchange 
for Security and Convenience (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2007).
15) e.g. P Regan, ‘Privacy as a common good in the digital 
world’ (2002) 5(3) Information, Communication & Society, 
382.
16) P Schwartz, ‘Privacy, property and personal data’ (2004) 
117 Harvard Law Review 2056; J Rule (n 14); L Lessig, 
Code 2.0 (New York 2006); E J Janger (n 14), etc. See 
Chapter 6 in N Purtova (n 6) for a more detailed account of 
the various arguments against and in favor of property 
rights in personal data.
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one’s data and informational self-determination. Yet, 
at the time of writing, under EU data protection 
law, property rights in personal data are not 
acknowledged explicitly and remain ill-defined.17)
As I argued elsewhere,18) what makes property 
rights a suitable legal instrument to achieve in-
dividual control over one’s personal data is its 
erga omnes effect, enabling data subjects to en-
force their control over personal data against the 
entire world. This is especially useful in the 
complex conditions of the modern data flows 
where location of data and the chain of control 
over it are often hard to trace to known contract 
parties. A system of personal data licenses based 
on the default control rights of the data subjects 
– akin to what Paul Schwartz, James Rule and 
Edward Janger propose in the context of the 
United States19) - would create a coherent and 
more articulate framework for personal data 
management that allows data use but also is 
respectful of the principle of information self-
determination,20) where information self-determi-
nation is understood as ‘the capacity of the in-
dividual to determine in principle the disclosure 
and use of his/her personal data’.21)
To achieve greater insight into how the prop-
erty regime could grasp the complexity of the 
modern relationships vis-à-vis personal data, and 
form a regulatory framework for the data flow 
17) As argued in N Purtova ‘Default entitlements in personal 
data in the Proposed Regulation: Informational 
Self-Determination Off the Table … and Back On Again?’ 
(2014) 30(1) Computer Law and Security Review, 6.
18) See Purtova (n 16) for a full argument on how property 
rights in personal data can achieve data protection 
purposes.
19) Purtova (n 17).
20) Purtova (n 16).
21) P De Hert and S Gutwirth, ‘Data protection in the case law 
of the Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalisation in 
action’ in S Gutwirth et al (eds) Reinventing data protection 
(Springer 2009) 14.
that is respectful of the information self-determi-
nation, it is helpful to look at the system of 
English land law. Briefly, English land law gov-
erns what a continental lawyer would call 
‘property rights in immovables’. Like personal da-
ta, land is a valuable resource that is transferred 
to multiple actors, who put it to many uses.22) To 
accommodate these uses, and grant protection to 
respective interests in land, modern land law de-
veloped into a pyramid-like system of rights and 
interests, with the right with the most broad scope 
- fee simple - at the bottom, and leases - property 
rights of a narrower scope - at the top. The con-
tent of these rights has been tailored to account 
for the most popular uses of land, and, according 
to the principle of numerus clausus, no other 
rights in land, save for those on the list of recog-
nized property entitlements, receive erga omnes 
protection. The transfer of leases - the ‘lesser’ 
rights in a piece of land - does not undermine, 
although it does limit, the ‘greater’ right of fee 
simple. However, at all times, until the fee simple 
is transferred in full, its holder retains some con-
trol over his property, e.g. the right of access in 
order to maintain an object of property rights in a 
proper state, etc.
In a search for this quality, namely the capacity 
to exercise control over a transfer and retain some 
control after the transfer takes place, a similar 
system of property rights could be built around 
personal data. An individual - the data subject - 
could be said to have the broadest property right 
possible (although it would not be unlimited), in-
cluding a right to transfer his or her personal data 
for remuneration. The most important limitation 
22) Purtova (n 16) in Chapter 4 demonstrates that in modern 
property law whether an object is physical, like land, or in-
tangible, like personal data, does not matter.
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on the possible scope of this right would be a 
prohibition on the waiver of the data protection 
guarantees.23) In Europe where data protection has 
been recognized as a human and fundamental 
right,24) the core limitation on data transfers 
would be that a data subject may not waive the 
human rights guarantees, and so cannot relinquish 
the control over his or her personal data entirely.25) 
On this basis, it would not be possible for the 
control rights in personal data to be completely 
alienated for remuneration or counter performance 
or waived. 
The smaller rights in personal data that would 
be transferred from a data subject are comparable 
to leases in land law; the alienable ‘leases’ in per-
sonal data could be tailored to reflect most com-
mon uses of personal data, and could also vary in 
type, depending, e.g. on the duration and purpose 
limitations, e.g. excluding the use of the data for 
profiling. Moreover, pursuant to the principle of 
numerus clausus, recognising only a closed list of 
‘lesser’ property rights in personal data would be 
one step further along the road to ensuring that 
individuals are not forced into relinquishing total 
control over their personal information. 
It would be a matter of policy as to whether 
actors other than a data subject should be per-
23) N Purtova ‘Private law solutions in European data pro-
tection’ (2010) 28(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 179.
24) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in Art. 8, and most re-
cently, in Satamedia case where the ECtHR seems to have 
expanded the scope of Art 8 ECHR to cover data pro-
tection regardless of the kind of data processed (paae 137 
of the judgment reads as follows: “Article 8 of the 
Convention thus provides for the right to a form of in-
formational self-determination, allowing individuals to rely 
on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neu-
tral, are collected, processed and disseminated collectively 
and in such a form or manner that their Article 8 rights may 
be engaged.”).
25) Purtova (n 16), Chapter 9. 
mitted to enjoy property rights over personal da-
ta, or whether a situation in which the individual 
is the only holder of property rights over his 
personal information should be maintained. In the 
latter case scenario the exercise of transfers from 
one actor to another will be on the basis of a 
contract. 
Such a system of property rights could, in 
theory, be implemented through the use of 
so-called ‘sticky technologies’ which enable the 
rights relating to a piece of data to ‘travel’ with 
it and help verify compliance of a particular data 
processing operation with the conditions imposed 
on it.26) In sum, the protective potential of the 
individual property rights in personal data is in 
providing an alternative and arguably more 
effective legal tool facilitating individual control 
over collection and use of the data pertaining to 
the individual. 
2. Acknowledging economic interest 
and investment in data
As a part of its Digital Single Market Strategy, 
Europe has declared its commitment to develop as 
a data economy.27) Data has been acknowledged 
as an essential resource for economic growth, and 
it is estimated that by 2020 the size of the EU da-
ta economy may increase to €739 billion, or 4% 
of the overall EU GDP.28) Against this back-
26) E.g., see J Cohen, ‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy 
and the Subject as Object’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 
1391.
27) European Commission, “Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A 
Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe” COM (2015) 192 
final, 6 may 2015, Brussels, 14.
28) European Commission ‘Building a European Data Economy’, 
published 10 January 2017, available online at <https://ec.
europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/building-europ
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ground, legal rules on allocation and extent of 
control over data, i.e. exclusive rights and the 
rights of access, become increasingly important. 
Therefore it comes as no surprise that the EU 
policymakers intend to address the issue of data 
ownership.29) Recent EU law addresses both 
individuals’ and companies’ economic stakes in 
personal data through property-like rights.
On the individual level, GDPR introduced the 
right to data portability in relation to personal 
data. A number of scholars suggest that data port-
ability is conducive of or closely akin to the prop-
erty-rights approach to data protection, or data 
ownership.30) Albeit, these authors seem to focus 
on what Rubinstein calls “property-related actions 
like trading, exchanging, or selling data”, rather 
than the defining element of property rights, i.e. 
the right to exclude. Under Article 20 GDPR, an 
individual to whom the data relates (‘data 
subject’) has a right to receive a copy of person-
al data pertaining to him or her in a structured, 
commonly used and machine-readable format and 
to transmit those data to - in the data protection 
parlance - another ‘controller’, i.e. any person or 
legal entity who determines the purposes and 
means of data processing. According to Article 29 
Working Party, the EU advisory authority on data 
protection, ‘[t]he primary aim of data portability is 
enhancing individual’s control … and making sure 
they play an active role in the data ecosystem’,31) 
among others, by preventing service lock-ins. 
ean-data-economy>, last accessed 27 September 2017.
29) European Commission (n 27).
30) e.g. IS Rubinstein, ‘Big Data: e End of Privacy or a New 
Beginning?’ (2013) 3(2) International Data Privacy Law, 74; 
P Swire & Y Lagos, ‘Why the right to data portability likely 
reduces consumer welfare: antitrust and privacy critique’ 
(2013) 72(2) Maryland Law Rev. 335, 373.
31) Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on the right to data 
portability’, 5 April 2017, 16/EN WP 242 rev.01., 4, fn 1.
Tene and Polonetsky consider data portability in a 
reusable format a way for the information industry 
to share the wealth created from personal data 
with those individuals, and predict that it will 
create a market for the user-centric personal-data 
applications providing the data analytics and 
management services for the benefit of the data 
subjects alone.32)
Although not relating to the right to exclude, 
the proposed Digital Content Directive33) ac-
knowledges the economic role of personal data in 
digital economy as asset or even currency, among 
others, as counter-performance by the consumer in 
exchange for digital content:
In the digital economy, digital content is of-
ten supplied without the payment of a price and 
suppliers use the consumer’s personal data they 
have access to in the context of the supply 
of the digital content or digital service.34)
The Directive will apply to such contracts 
(Article 3). Among others, in the event of termi-
nation of a contract, the supplier will bear an ob-
ligation to reimburse fully or partially payment 
under the contract (Article 13a(1) and (2)) and 
comply with the Article 20 GDPR data portability 
obligations when personal data is concerned 
(Article 13a(3)).35)
32) O Tene and J Polonetsky, ‘Big data for All: Privacy and 
User Control in the Age of Analytics’ (2013) 11(5) 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual 
Property, 264.
33) EU Presidency, General approach on Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digi-
tal content first reading), published in Brussels on 1 June 
2017.
34) Ibid., 8, fn 15.
35) For a more detailed analysis of the right to data portability 
under GDPR and outside of the data protection, including 
the proposed Directive on digital content, see I De Graef, M 
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At the same time, the EU Intellectual Property 
law acknowledges quasi-property claims of the 
information industry in personal data. In partic-
ular, personal data aggregated by the information 
industry may be subject to sui generis database 
right or be protected as a trade secret.36) Sui 
generis database rights protect exclusive rights in 
databases resulting from ‘substantial investment’ 
in the collection, verification or presentation of 
data;37) the ‘substantial investment’ expressed, e.g. 
in efforts of collection, classification or cleaning. 
Protection is granted against extraction or reuse of 
substantial part of the database, or of unsubstantial 
part in case of extraction and reuse which are 
systematic (Article 7 Database directive). Trade 
secrets protect commercial information where its 
economic value to a firm hinges on it remaining 
secret,38) for instance, customer lists and profiles. 
The protection is granted against unlawful acquis-
ition of secrets (Article 4(2) of the Trade secrets 
directive). It is predicted that the IP claims in 
personal data and the Article 20 GDPR data 
portability right will clash once the GDPR enters 
into effect.39)
Husovec and N Purtova ‘Data Portability and Data Control: 
Lessons for an Emerging Concept in EU Law’ 
(forthcoming).
36) The following overview of the IP claims in data substantially 
relies in the overview in I De Graef, M Husovec and N 
Purtova, ibid.
37) Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of data-
bases (‘Database Directive’) [1996] OJ L 77/20 and Case 
C-203/02, The British Horseracing Board, EU:C:2004:695.
38) Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed 
know-how and business information (trade secrets) against 
their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (‘Trade Secret 
Directive’) [2016] OJ L 157/1.
39) I De Graef, M Husovec and N Purtova, n 35.
3. Sharing in data-generated wealth
and data access: data ‘haves’ and
‘have-nots’
Given the high economic value of personal data 
it is no surprise that the generated wealth is not 
distributed equally, when the large digital plat-
forms capitalize on personal data of their users, 
among others, through rapid expansion of in-
tellectual property rights,40) and the users see 
none of it. This is akin to what Boyle describes as 
the “Second Enclosure Movement” in the context 
of knowledge and ideas, or as he puts it, the 
‘intangible commons of the mind’.41)
To illustrate, Evgeny Morozov in his Financial 
Times piece42) has argued that digital giants like 
Google and Facebook harvest, hoard, hold mo-
nopoly over and exclusively profit from the pools 
of data collected through their various services, 
whereas these pools are not available to anyone 
else. Alternatively, the large private platform pro-
viders are in full control of access to data which 
increasingly becomes a critical resource. Everyone 
else: people, researchers, smaller data-centred 
businesses and others are precluded from profiting 
from these valuable data assets, unless granted 
access by the platform providers. The latter thus 
become the gatekeepers of data and access to the 
data-generated forms of knowledge.
I have argued elsewhere43) that the lack of 
clear allocation of de jure property rights to the 
40) See 2.2.
41) J Boyle, ‘The Second Enclosure Movement and the 
Construction of the Public Domain’ (2003) 66(1-2) Law 
and Contemporary Problems 33–74.
42) E Morozov ‘Europe is wrong to take a sledgehammer to Big 
Google’ The Financial Times, 12 January 2015 available 
online at www.ft.com.
43) N Purtova, ‘The illusion of personal data as no one’s prop-
erty’ (2015) 7(1) Law, Innovation and Technology, 83-111.
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individuals by default is conducive of this data 
enclosure, where a few actors within the personal 
data-intensive Information Industry with the stron-
gest market power are able to make and effectuate 
the strongest de facto exclusive claim on personal 
data, resulting in the division between the data 
‘haves versus the have-nots, the elite versus the 
masses.’44) The divide may lie between the large 
private digital platforms and everyone else, the 
rich and the poor, as well as along the boundaries 
of the ‘first’, ‘second’ and ‘third’ worlds, race and 
social class.45) Allocating property rights in per-
sonal data to individuals and effectuating them 
through, e.g. the data portability instruments,46) 
will arguably help avoid this enclosure at least in 
part within the European borders. 
Ⅲ. Feasibility of Property Rights In 
Personal Data Revisited
1. Individual control and network 
effects of personal data choices 
As Section 2 shows, from the data privacy per-
spective, the main benefit behind of introducing 
property rights in personal data is creation of an 
effective legal tool to enforce individual control 
over his or her personal data. Property rights lan-
guage is arguably just another way for the data 
protection rights to be phrased. Yet, the idea that 
an individual can in fact exercise the control 
44) C Hess and E Ostrom ‘Introduction: An overview of the 
knowledge commons’ (2007) in C Hess and E Ostrom 
(eds.) Understanding Knowledge as Commons (MIT Press 
2007) 13.
45) L Taylor, ‘What Is Data Justice? The Case for Connecting 
Digital Rights and Freedoms Globally’, June 26, 2017, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2918779.
46) See 2.2.
rights effectively has been criticised as naïve for a 
while now. The primary example of such criticism 
is the discussion around consent as a ground of 
legitimate data processing in Europe.47) This paper 
will not engage with this discussion further, but 
only highlight its core. In short, leaving aside the 
debate on (the absence of real) consent in ‘take it 
or leave it’ situations and the accessibility of the 
privacy policies to a lay person, which could be 
helped with regulation and enforcement, there is a 
number of substantive points where the concept of 
consent seems to fail without major reshaping.48) 
In the age of constant data collection and hun-
dreds of data processing operations pertaining to 
one individual each day, it is believed that it is 
too much to ask of an individual to make truly in-
formed decisions about each data processing oper-
ation, whether or not he or she wishes for his/her 
data to be processed. It is also a common argu-
ment that given the length and complexity of the 
privacy policies, sometimes reaching hundreds of 
pages and written in legalese, it is unreasonable to 
expect that an individual can read and compre-
hend them and give a truly informed consent. Due 
to the phenomenon called bounded rationality an 
individual is arguably unable to anticipate on the 
full range of consequences of his/her consent and 
the resulting data processing.49) Finally, the field 
of behavioural economics of privacy has demon-
47) e.g. E Kosta Consent in European data protection law 
(Martinus Nijhof 2013).
48) The proposals for adjustment of consent include collective 
and assisted consent in L Bygrave and D Schartum, 
‘Consent, proportionality, and collective power’ in 
Reinventing data protection (Springer 2009) and R. 
Brownsword ‘Consent in data protection law: Privacy, fair 
processing and confidentiality’ in S Gutwirth et al (eds) 
Reinventing data protection (Springer 2009).
49) E.g. RAND corporation, ‘Review of the European Data 
Protection Directive: Technical Report Prepared for the 
Information Commissioner’s Office’, 29-30.
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strated that individual control and consent are 
prone to manipulation, depending on how the con-
ditions of consent are formulated.50) Bygrave and 
Schartum and Brownsword suggest that with some 
adjustments in interpretation and application, con-
sent and hence individual control should continue 
to be one of the key data protection rules, e.g. in 
the form of collective or assisted consent. 
However, the ability of an individual alone to 
exercise control over his or her data is not in the 
centre of this analysis. The further discussion 
therefore will focus on whether or not such con-
trol should be individual, since the effects of data 
processing following the individual consent are of-
ten not limited to that individual alone. Most re-
cent academic thinking on the ripple effects of 
privacy choices has been focusing on the potential 
of personal data originating from one person to 
impact others. Genetic data is an often used as an 
example. While this may be a decision of one to 
share his/her genetic data, the information re-
vealed will pertain not only to the person sharing, 
but also to an entire group of his/her blood rela-
tives over several past and future generations.51) 
Remarkably, in the age of proliferation of data 
collection any personal data, in a way, is like ge-
netic data: one may decide to live a device-free 
life not to be subjected to decisions made on the 
basis of data processing. Yet, there will always be 
a significant group of people like him / her - e.g. 
50) L Brandimarte, A Acquisti and G Loewenstein, ‘Misplaced 
Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox’ (2012) 4(3) 
Social Psychological and Personality Science, 340-347.
51) e.g. BR Goldman, ‘Pharmacogenomics: Privacy in the Era 
of Personalized Medicine’ (2005) 4(1) Northwestern Journal 
of Technology and Intellectual Property, 84; J Gniady, 
‘Regulating Direct to Consumer Genetic Testing’, 76(5) 
Fordham Law Review, 2429; Article 29 Working Party, 
‘Working Document on Genetic Data’ Adopted on 17 March 
2004, 12178/03/EN (WP 91), 4.
neighbours sharing a postal area code, gender, 
age, or other characteristics - who are wiling to 
disclose their data, and modern analytics will be 
able to process more seemingly irrelevant data to 
produce information of significance that would 
contribute to a profile that would eventually be 
applied to the person who meant to opt out. For 
example, health-, socio-economic and other data 
extracted from a ‘smart community’ in Africa 
used essentially as a ‘data farm’ to develop a dis-
ease profile could also be applied to shape life of 
communities thousands of kilometres away, on 
other continents. For the reasons of these network 
effects of individual privacy choices and because 
in the context of the modern information practices 
no personal data remains strictly personal, there is 
a growing understanding of insufficiency of the 
individual data protection rights and a growing 
number of arguments in favour of group pri-
vacy52) and some form of collective rights in 
data.53)
2. Transparency of property rights and 
blurry boundaries of the concept 
‘personal data’
As explained in the Introduction, transparency 
is one of the two leading principles of property 
law that separates property- from non-property 
rights.54) The principle of transparency dictates 
that in order to be recognized as property rights, 
the rights have to be made public, e.g. by regis-
tration (in the case of immovable property) or 
52) e.g. L Taylor, L Floridi and B van der Sloot (eds.) Group 
privacy (Springer 2017).
53) e.g. A Montelero ‘Personal data for decisional purposes in 
the age of analytics: From an individual to a collective di-
mension of data protection’ (2016) 32(2) CLSR, 238-255.
54) Van Erp (n 11) p. 10.
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possession (in the case of movable objects).55) 
This is because the effect of property rights 
against everyone (as opposed to against con-
tractual parties for contract-based rights) is the 
strongest and imposes the heaviest burden, and so, 
to comply, everyone needs to know when and in 
relation to which object property rights exist. This 
section will show that personal data is a difficult 
object of property rights when it comes to the 
principle of transparency, which has to do with 
the increasingly blurry boundaries of the concept 
‘personal data’.
The 1995 Data Protection Directive defines per-
sonal data as ‘any information relating to an iden-
tified or identifiable natural person (‘data sub-
ject’)’ (Article 2(a)). According to Recital 26, ‘to 
determine whether a person is identifiable, ac-
count should be taken of all the means likely rea-
sonably to be used either by the controller or by 
any other person to identify the said person’. 
GDPR adopts the same definition (Article 4(1)) 
and Recital 26 of GDPR similarly requires that 
‘account should be taken of all the means reason-
ably likely to be used either by the controller or 
by any other person to identify the individual di-
rectly or indirectly.’
Article 29 Working Party (‘WP29’) adopted a 
non-binding opinion aimed to streamline the na-
tional implementation of the definition of personal 
data.56) WP29 explains the definition of personal 
data as comprised of three essential elements: per-
sonal data is (1) any information that (2) relates 
to people, who are (3) personally identified or 
identifiable, directly or indirectly.57) 
55) Ibid.
56) Article 29 Working Party (2007) Opinion 4/2007 on the 
concept of personal data, published 20 June 2007, (WP 
136).
57) Ibid.
Let us begin with the identifiability. It is wide-
ly acknowledged that - given the condition of the 
modern data processing technologies, namely, 
growing technical ability to identify previously 
anonymous data sets and the resulting gradual 
failure of anonymisation, the same piece of data 
may be more or less easily identifiable to an 
individual. Famously, film rating records of 
500.000 Netflix subscribers were re-identified in 
2008 using the openly accessible Internet Movie 
Database.58) In 2013 travel routes of celebrities 
such as Bradley Cooper and Olivia Munn, includ-
ing street addresses, and whether or not they left 
a tip, where deduced from the “anonymised” pub-
lic database of the New York taxi rides which 
contained no passenger information, and paparazzi 
pictures.59) In 2014 knowing location of credit 
card holders on 4 occasions allowed to re-identify 
90% of 3 months of credit card transactions, 
chronicling the spending of 1.1 million people in 
10,000 shops, having access only to amounts 
spent, shop type and a code representing each 
person. Knowing the amounts spent on these 4 
occasions lead to re-identification of nearly all 
card-holders.60)
As the EU Court of Justice ruled recently in 
the Breyer case61) data may be treated as data re-
lating to an ‘identifiable natural person’ where the 
additional data necessary in order to identify are 
58) A Narayanan and V Shmatikov, ‘Robust de-anonymisation 
of large datasets. (How to break anonymity of Netflix Prize 
dataset)’ (2008) Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy, 111.
59) JK Trotter ‘Public NYC Taxicab Database Lets You See How 
Celebrities Tip’, Gawker 23 October 2014, available 
http://gawker.com/the-public-nyc-taxicab-database-that-
accidentally-track-1646724546, accessed 25 August 2017.
60) J Bohannon, ‘Credit card study blows holes in anonymity’ 
(2015) 347 (6221) Science, 468.
61) Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-582/14, 
Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, judgment of 
19 October 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779.
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held by a third party (among others, paras. 41 and 
43). What matters is if combining the necessary 
data ‘constitutes a means likely reasonably to be 
used to identify the data subject’ (para. 45). It 
would not be the case ‘if the identification of the 
data subject was prohibited by law or practically 
impossible on account of the fact that it requires 
a disproportionate effort in terms of time, cost and 
man-power, so that the risk of identification ap-
pears in reality to be insignificant’ (para. 46). 
WP29 xplains that, in addition, a number of other 
factors should be accounted for in determining the 
likelihood of identification: ‘[t]he intended pur-
pose, the way the processing is structured, the ad-
vantage expected by the controller, the interests at 
stake for the individuals, as well as the risk of or-
ganisational dysfunctions (e.g. breaches of con-
fidentiality duties) and technical failures.’62) 
Crucially, Art 29 WP explains that ‘the test is a 
dynamic one and should consider the state of the 
art in technology at the time of the processing and 
the possibilities for development during the period 
for which the data will be processed.’63) While 
identification may not be possible at the time of 
processing, the state of art of technology, degree 
of data aggregation and hence the likelihood of 
identification may change, rendering the same da-
ta set identifiable. 
This is exactly because of this fluid boundary 
between identifiable and non-identifiable data that 
establishing, exercising, and managing transparent 
property rights in personal data might prove 
problematic. Since the state of identifiability may 
change from low likelihood to ‘reasonably likely’, 
and the change may well take place unnoticed 
both by the data holder and data subjects, de-
62) Opinion 4/2007 (WP 136) of 20 June 2007, p. 15.
63) Ibid.
termining when (and whose) property rights 
emerge, what rights must be respected and can be 
enforced in relation to which data is one of the 
key challenges for propertization. 
Let us now move to the first two elements of 
the definition of personal data which also present 
problems when in comes to the property rights 
transparency and clarity of the conceptual bounda-
ries of personal data. In order to be considered 
personal data, in addition to being identifiable to 
an individual, data needs to relate to or mean 
something about that individual. This follows 
from the part of the definition where personal data 
is any information that relates to people. 
According to WP29, for the purposes of the defi-
nition, information should be considered relating 
to people in a relevant way when it relates in 
content, purpose or result, i.e. respectively, when 
it is about that person (e.g. home address, list of 
university grades, or results of a medical test); or 
it is used or is likely to be used with the purpose 
to evaluate, treat in a certain way or influence sta-
tus or behaviour of a person; or it has or is likely 
to have impact on a person’s rights and interests, 
even in minor ways.64) Some information is per-
ceived as relevant more easily, for instance, in-
formation ‘generated’ by (observing) people (e.g. 
administrative records of people’s off-line lives, 
and digital records of online behaviour like web-
sites visited, texts and images uploaded; in-
formation generated through use of ‘smart’ objects 
and devices like phones or fitness bracelets), or 
objects people interact with (their cars, homes, 
computers). At the same time, some information 
is hard to intuitively place in any connection of 
relevance for anyone: e.g. the amount of weight a 
64) Ibid., 9 et seq.
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block of concrete can withstand, or the amount of 
sand crystals in a cubic meter of sand in the 
Sahara desert. In order to establish transparent 
property rights in personal data it is therefore im-
portant whether or not there is a link between an 
individual and a piece of data ‘that matters.’65) In 
the opinion on the Nowak case pending before the 
EU Court of Justice regarding status of an exami-
nation script as personal data, AG Kokkot sug-
gests that the criterion of relation to an individual 
is also dynamic.66) The same bit of data can be of 
no relation to an individual under some circum-
stances, and relate to that individual under another 
set of circumstances, likely depending on the sim-
ilar factors as identifiabilty. 
However, how meaning is ‘attached’ to data by 
modern machines is beyond the grasp of human 
mind.67) The game-changer is a new generation of 
data-processing algorithms based on machine 
learning. Machine learning is the ability of com-
puter algorithms to learn from data and make pre-
dictions for new situations,68) and improve auto-
matically through experience.69) The new algo-
65) According to Art 29 WP, “this building block of the defi-
nition [relate to] is crucial as it is very important to pre-
cisely find out which are the relations/links that matter and 
how to distinguish them” (ibid.).
66) “It is true that the extent of the link between an examination 
candidate and his performance in an examination increases 
according to the extent to which he has to formulate the 
answers himself.” (Case C-434/16 Peter Nowak v Data 
Protection Commissioner, ECLI:EU:C:2017:582, Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott, delivered on 20 July 2017, para. 
23).
67) M Hildebrandt, ‘The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right 
for the Profiling Era’ in J. et al Bus (ed), Digital 
Enlightenment Yearbook (IOS Press 2012) 53; JP van 
Bendegem, ‘Neat Algorithms in Messy Environments’, in M. 
Hildebrandt and S. Gutwirth (eds.), Profiling the European 
Citizen. Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Springer 2008), 
80-83. 
68) J Stajic, R Stone, G Chin, and B Wible, ‘Rise of the 
Machines’ (2015) 349 (6245) Science 248-249 (published 
17 July 2015).
69) MI Jordan and TM Mitchell, ‘Machine learning: Trends, per-
rithms are autonomous, i.e. self-learning, self-re-
pairing, and self-managing and form the core of 
the modern approach to Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), a strand of computer science aimed to build 
computers as intelligent agents. The way advanced 
AI self-learning algorithms make sense of data is 
not transparent even for their designers. Hence, 
the new AI algorithms work as a black box that 
is truly beyond human cognition.70) These AI 
self-learning autonomous machines together with 
unprecedented amount of data already stored in 
databases or live-streamed, form the essence of 
Big Data71) and have the ability to harness in-
formation in fundamentally novel ways.72) In ef-
fect, we can no longer say that some data has no 
meaning. In fact, it is safer to assume that all data 
potentially has meaning, even if not for humans. 
This proposition may have a slight science fiction 
ring to it; yet, it will become more real as the 
AI-operated ‘smart’ communities and infra-
structures become more and more embedded in 
our daily lives, where increasing number of pa-
rameters is quantified and processed by the AI al-
gorithms in order to subject the users of in-
telligent infrastructures to the data-driven 
decisions. This blurring line between data that 
means something as opposed to data that means 
nothing with regard to an individual adds an addi-
tional level of complexity, first, in determining at 
spectives, and prospects’ (2015) 349(6245) Science, pub-
lished 17 July 2015, 255.
70) M Hildebrandt n 67, 53; JP Van Bendegem, ‘Neat 
Algorithms in Messy Environments’, in M. Hildebrandt and 
S. Gutwirth (eds.), Profiling the European Citizen. 
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Springer 2008), 80-83. 
71) M Hildebrandt, ‘Slaves to Big Data. Or Are We?’ (2013) 16 
IDP Revista De Internet, Derecho Y Política, published 
December 2013, available online at http://works.bepress.com
/mireille_hildebrandt/52/.
72) V Mayer-Schönberger and K Cukier, Big data: A revolution 
that will transform how we live, work, and think (Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt 2013), 29.
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which point the level of relation to an individual 
is sufficient to establish property rights, and sec-
ond, in tracing the presence of such a relation 
when opaque AI algorithms are involved. 
Ⅳ. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper aimed to revisit the European debate 
on the introduction of property rights in personal 
data in order to include the newest developments 
in law and data processing practices, such as the 
advances in Big Data. I have argued that there are 
clear indications that the idea of property in per-
sonal data should be given a serious consid-
eration: the protective potential of the property 
rights to work as an alternative legal tool to en-
force individual control over personal data, the 
need to acknowledge the economic value and 
function of personal data as a resource both for 
the information industry and for individuals, and 
finally, the de facto presence of the property-like 
claims of the information industry in personal da-
ta, and the need to take measures to ensure that 
the data-generated wealth is shared fairly. Yet, the 
analysis shows that personal data does not lend it-
self easily as an object of individual property 
rights. Namely, personal data cannot be consid-
ered as concerning just an individual anymore; da-
ta processing resulting from a decision of one per-
son will inevitably have spill-over effects on oth-
ers, e.g. as a result of profiling, or as a result of 
the same piece of data relating to a group of peo-
ple, e.g. genetic data. Therefore, true individual 
control over personal data and also the effective 
enforcement of the individual property rights in 
personal data are difficult if not impossible to 
achieve. At the same time, the reasons to create 
erga omnes protection of data grounded in the da-
ta economic value and sharing of the data-gen-
erated wealth still stand. This - in combination 
with the added advantages of collective and as-
sisted consent suggested by Bygrave et al and 
Brownsword - points to the necessity to consider 
collective property rights in data and collective 
data management.
In addition, personal data is a difficult object of 
property rights when it comes to the principle of 
the property rights transparency. Namely, the 
same piece of data may behave as personal and 
non-personal under different circumstances: it may 
be more or less identifiable, and have a stronger 
or weaker link to a person, and the moment of 
transition from one state to another may pass un-
noticed by the data holder and the affected in-
dividuals and groups. This makes invoking and 
enforcing property rights in personal data 
challenging. An added challenge is in identifying 
the boundaries of the groups or communities to 
whom the data pertains. The groups contributing 
to and affected by data, or the groups for whom 
the data is relevant are not always static and their 
boundaries shift. Taylor et al point out that it is 
challenging to structure accountability in the era 
“where almost everyone is constantly being group-
ed and regrouped, unaware, by data analytics”.73) 
Some substantial work has been done by e.g. 
Giseppe on ‘calculated publics’74), groups con-
structed by algorithms where people are influ-
enced towards certain behaviour. What is clear is 
73) L Taylor, L Floridi and B. van der Sloot, ‘Conclusion: what 
do we know about group privacy?’, in Taylor, Floridi and 
van der Sloot eds. n 52.
74) T Gillespie, ‘The Relevance of Algorithms,’ In Media tech-
nologies: Essays on communication, materiality, and soci-
ety T. Gillespie, P. Boczkowski, & K. Foot (eds.), 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2014) 167-194.
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that these communities have to have a sufficient 
degree of stability in order to have relatively sta-
bile boundaries of the data they would claim 
property in and manage, and to enable their par-
ticipation in the data management.
Going beyond the discussion if this paper and 
looking into the future of the data ownership de-
bate, I foresee that it will soon transcend the do-
main of personal data and shift to the domain of 
data generally. This is because at least two con-
texts of the property debate will remain valid con-
cerning data rather than personal data, i.e. the 
context of acknowledging the economic value of 
data and its role in the economy, and the dis-
cussion on the fair distribution of the data-gen-
erated wealth. 
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